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NOTE
A BITTER PILL TO SWALLOW: THE NEED FOR A
CLEARLY-DEFINED COURSE OF PROFESSIONAL
PRACTICE WHEN PRESCRIBING OPIOIDS FOR
THE LEGITIMATE MEDICAL PURPOSE OF
TREATING PAIN
I.

INTRODUCTION

The following premise, translated from its original Greek, is a
portion of the Hippocratic Oath. An oath that, although antiquated, still
prescribes some of the fundamental principles for "ideal conduct" by
physicians: "I will neither give a deadly drug to anybody who asked for
it, nor will I make a suggestion to this effect."' This oath, attributed to
Hippocrates and held sacred among physicians, is an oath whereby
physicians swear to treat patients to the best of their abilities.2 The
relevance of this oath to the medical community is exemplified by the fact
that most practitioners take a modem version of this oath upon graduation
from medical school.' Although the principles of this oath are paramount
to the practice of medicine, some physicians have lost sight of the
teachings of Hippocrates, placing monetary gain before the health and
lives of their patients, and essentially, providing potentially-lethal
prescription drugs simply because the patient is willing to pay for them.4
Since the 1990s, doctors have prescribed opioid medications to treat
non-cancer-related chronic pain, such as that which stems from back
injuries and arthritis.' This type of pain "includes any painful condition
1.

The

Hippocratic Oath and Others, MCMASTER

UNIV.

HEALTH

SCI. LIBRARY,

https://hslmcmaster.libguides.com/c.php?g=306726&p=2044095 (last updated April 26, 2019, 11:46
AM).
2. William C. Shiel Jr., Medical Definition of Hippocratic Oath, MED. NET
https://www.medicinenet.com/script/main/art.asp?articlekey=20909 (last visited Sept. 17, 2019).
3. Christopher J. Kim, The Trial of ConradMurray: Prosecuting Physiciansfor Criminally

Negligent Over-Prescription,51 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 517, 520-23 (2014).
4. See id. at 522-23 (discussing the statement issued by Michael Jackson's family after his
death from drugs prescribed by his personal physician, "that '[physicians] cannot sell their services
5.

Opioid Prescribing: Where

You Live Matters, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL

&

to the highest bidder and cast aside their Hippocratic Oath to do no harm"').
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that persists for at least three months and is not associated with malignant
disease." 6 Accompanying this trend of prescribing opioids for chronic
pain is a drastic increase in the rate and volume with which opioids are
prescribed throughout the United States. 7 There were more than 59,000
opioid-related deaths that occurred in the United States during 2016.8 On
October 26, 2017, the Department of Health and Human Services
"declare[d] the opioid crisis a public health emergency," at the order of
President Trump.9
Prescribers are the primary source of the prescription opioids that are
fueling the epidemic.' 0 The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
("CDC") has indicated that roughly half of all overdoses attributed to
opioids involve prescription painkillers and that the approximate
250,000,000 opioid prescriptions written in 2013 were enough to supply
every adult in the nation with their "own bottle of pills."" Although
tremendous, these numbers are not a fair representation of the entire
medical community, as only a small percentage of prescribers in each state
are responsible for at least half of all opioid prescriptions written.12
The regulation of controlled substances occurs on both the federal
and state levels; on the federal level, through the Controlled Substances
Act ("CSA") which derives its authority from the Commerce Clause of
the United States Constitution," and on the state level through the
controlled substances acts of individual states, which gamer authority
from the state police powers conferred by the Tenth Amendment.1 4 This
causes variations in regulation from state-to-state 15 and makes the huge
disparity between the highest and lowest-prescribing counties in the
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/vitalsigns/opioids/index.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2019).
6. Jason W. Busse et al., Guideline for Opioid Therapy and Chronic Noncancer Pain, 189

CAN. MED. Ass'N J. E659, E659 (May 8, 2017).
7. Opioid Prescribing:Where You Live Matters, supra note 5.
8. Julie Hirschfeld Davis, In Declaration,No New Funds for Drug Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
27, 2017, at Al, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/26/us/politics/trump-opioid-crisis.html.

9. Id.
10. Michael C. Barnes & Gretchen Arndt, The Best of Both Worlds: Applying Federal
&

Commerce and State Police Powers to Reduce PrescriptionDrug Abuse, 16 J. HEALTH CARE L.

POL'Y 271,276 (2013).
11. Alyssa M. McClure, Note, Illegitimate Overprescription:How Burrage v. United States Is
HinderingPunishment of Physicians and Bolstering the Opioid Epidemic, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV.

1747, 1750-51 (2018).
12.

See Cassandra Rivais & Bruce D. White, The OpioidEpidemic Is Not New: Time to Change

the Practice of Medicine, 11 ALB. GOV'T L. REV. 58, 69 (2017) (discussing the disproportionate
prescription practices among the opioid prescribers throughout the states, according to the
Prescription Behavior Surveillance System).
13. See Barnes & Arndt, supra note 10, at 279-81; see also U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
14. See Barnes & Arndt, supra note 10, at 279-80 (discussing state and federal authority to
regulate controlled substances); see also U.S. CONST. amend. X.
15. Barnes and Arndt, supra note 10, at 279.
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United States unsurprising.16 The CDC has noted that "[r]ates of opioid
prescribing vary greatly across states in ways that cannot be explained by
the underlying health status of the population, highlighting the lack of
consensus among clinicians on how to use opioid pain medication."17
Section 841(a) of the CSA, entitled "Unlawful acts," reads as
follows: "Except as authorized by this subchapter, it shall be unlawful for
any person knowingly or intentionally--(1) to manufacture, distribute, or
dispense, a controlled substance; or (2) to create, distribute, or dispense,
or possess with intent to distribute or dispense, a counterfeit substance." 8
The CSA provides an exemption for physicians1 9 and requires physicians
who prescribe controlled substances to register with the Attorney
General. 2 0 Registered physicians must comply with the CSA's provisions
that govern registrants. 2 1 The CSA "require[s] that prescriptions of
controlled substances 'must be ... for a legitimate medical purpose by an
individual practitioner acting in the usual course of his professional
practice."' 2 2 This language has proven difficult for the courts to apply, and
without clearer guidelines for prescribing opioid painkillers, doctors face
legal risks and uncertainty when treating patients for chronic pain.2 3
Although the CSA dictates this unclear standard,2 4 there is no
administrative oversight when a physician writes a prescription, and a
physician's approach to treatment remains up to his or her discretion.2 5
When a physician is deemed to have prescribed unlawfully-outside of
the bounds set forth by the CSA-he or she may be prosecuted under
section 841 of the Act and held criminally liable. 26 As an unfortunate
16. See OpioidPrescribing:Where You Live Matters, supra note 5. The CDC reported a sixfold differential in the prescribing of opioids between the highest and lowest prescribing counties in

2015. Id.
17. Deborah Dowell et al., CDC Guidelinesfor PrescribingOpioidsfor Chronic Pain-United
States, 2016, 65 CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION 1 (Mar. 18, 2016),
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/65/rr/rr6501el

htm.

18. 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2012).
19. United States v. MacKay, 715 F.3d 807, 814 (10th Cir. 2013).
20. 21 U.S.C. § 823 (2012); see Diane E. Hoffman, Treating Pain v. Reducing Drug Diversion
and Abuse: Recalibrating the Balance in Our Drug Control Laws and Policies, 1 ST. Louis U. J.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 231, 265 (2008) (discussing the Drug Enforcement Administration's
administration and enforcement of the CSA).

21.
22.
23.

Id.
Id. (quoting 21 C.F.R.
Id. at 265-66.

§

1306.04(a) (2008)).

24. See Katherine Goodman, Note, Prosecutionof Physicians as Drug Traffickers: The United
States' FailedProtectionofLegitimate Opioid PrescriptionUnder the ControlledSubstances Act and
South Australia'sAlternative Regulatory Approach, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 210,223 (2008)
(describing a broad overview of the CSA in comparison to its South Australian Counterpart).

25.
26.

Id. at 219.
See United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 124 (1975) (holding "that registered physicians

can be prosecuted under

§ 841

when their activities fall outside the usual course of professional
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consequence of this criminal liability, many patients who are truly
afflicted with chronic pain suffer because their treating physicians will not
prescribe opioids for non-cancer-related chronic pain out of the fear that
they will be prosecuted for doing so. 2 7
In Part II, this Note will discuss the history of the opioid epidemic,
including its death toll and current trajectory, the regulatory history
surrounding the prescribing of controlled substances, and the varying
28
applications of the CSA throughout the federal courts. Part III will
examine both permissive federal guidelines and state statute-based
guidelines for prescribing opioids.29 Part IV will propose a model statute
encompassing various guidelines and standards analyzed in the preceding
sections, that, if adopted, would help clarify what constitutes the course
30
of professional practice with respect to prescribing opioids. Part V will
sum up the need for this proposed statute in a country wrought with
opioid-related deaths and no definitive standard for prescribing them; it
will also urge state legislatures to adopt statutes like the one proposed to
help define the proper course of professional practice for
prescribing opioids.3
II.

REMOVING THE MASK OF UNCERTAINTY: THE PAST, PRESENT, AND
FUTURE OF REGULATION IN RESPONSE TO THE OPIOID EPIDEMIC

The United States is facing an opioid epidemic that claimed more
32
American lives in 2016 than both the Iraq and Vietnam wars combined.
It is extraordinarily troubling that prescription opioids contributed to
almost half of these deaths. 3 3 At the federal level, the CSA limits
prescriptions for controlled substances to those prescribed by physicians
for a legitimate medical purpose and within the course of their
professional practice. 34 However, in light of the impotent guidelines
provided by the federal government, this standard remains unclear, and it
is ultimately left to a jury of untrained individuals to decide whether or

practice").

27.

See Amy J. Dilcher, Damned If They Do, Damned If They Don't: The Need for a

Comprehensive Public Policy to Address the Inadequate Management of Pain, 13 ANNALS HEALTH
L. 81, 85 (2004) (discussing how the fear of criminal prosecution causes doctors to withhold opioid
pain medications from patients suffering from chronic pain that does not stem from cancer).
28. See infra Part I.

29.

See infra Part III.

30.
31.
32.

See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
McClure, supra note 11, at 1769.

33. Id.
34. See infra Part HI.B.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol47/iss4/8
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not a physician acted outside of the course of his or her medical practice
on the basis of competing expert testimony.
Subpart A provides an overview of the opioid epidemic, including its
rise from changing trends in opioid prescribing in the 1990s, following its
evolution over the years, its current trajectory, and its massive death toll.3 6
Subpart B then explores the various roles of state and federal governments
and provides a historical overview of regulation with respect to controlled
substances in the United States.37 Finally, Subpart C analyzes case law
from the Supreme Court of the United States and various federal circuit
courts, highlighting the difficulties associated with applying section
84 1(a) of the CSA to a jury trial where a physician is prosecuted for his
or her prescribing controlled substances, specifically opioids.3 8
A.

Death Toll of Epidemic Proportion

One of the primary directives of the medical community is to "do no
harm." 3 9 Despite this aim, the United States is suffering at the hands of an
opioid epidemic that killed over 200,000 people within its borders from
1999 to 201640-reaching "epidemic" status in "professional literature
and public discourse" in the past decade 4 1-and continues to kill at a rate
of roughly ninety Americans per day.4 2 This is alarming, given that
approximately half of the total overdose deaths amounting to this
epidemic involve prescription opioids, according to the CDC,43 and about
ninety-five percent of the prescription drugs abused by non-medical users
originate from prescriptions written by physicians.4
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

See infta Part I.C.
See infra Part H.A.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.C.
United States v. Volkman. 736 F.3d 1013, 1017 (6th Cir. 2013).

40. McClure, supranote 11, at 1751.
41. See Kelly K. Dineen, Addressing Prescription Opioid Abuse Concerns in Context;
Synchronizing Policy Solutions to Multiple Complex PublicHealth Problems,40 L. & PSYCHOL. REV.
2, 45-46 (2016) (discussing the emergence of the term "opioid epidemic" in the context of the rising

death toll associated with prescription opioids).
42.

McClure, supra note 11, at 1752.

43.

Id. at 1750-51.

44. Barnes & Arndt, supra note 10, at 276; see also FED. DRUG ADMIN, FDA EDUCATION
BLUEPRINT FOR HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS INVOLVED IN THE TREATMENT AND MONITORING OF
PATIENTS WITH PAIN, FED. DRUG ADMIN. 3 (2018), https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda-docs

/rems/Opioidanalgesic_2018_09-18_FDA-Blueprint.pdf. [hereinafter Monitoring of Patients with
Pain]; OpioidAnalgesic Risk Evaluation and MitigationStrategy (REMS), FED. DRUG ADMIN. (Sept.
27, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/drugs/information-drug-class/opioid-analgesic-risk-evaluation-andmitigation-strategy-rems ("The increasing availability of prescription opioids since the 1990's has
been accompanied by an epidemic of opioid addiction. The Substance Abuse and Mental Health
Services Administration's NationalSurvey ofDrug Use and Health has shown that most people who
use prescription analgesics 'nonmedically' obtain them from friends or family, who it is believed

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2019
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Notably, opioids act as a gateway-drug "with nearly 80 percent of
heroin users having previously used prescription painkillers."5 The CDC
has acknowledged a correlation between the amount of opioid-induced
overdoses and the number of opioids prescribed.4 6 What is especially
alarming is the rapid growth of this epidemic in recent years.4 7 Since 1999,
the death toll from prescription opioids has increased over-fourfold,
48
killing more individuals in 2016 than the HIV epidemic at its height. If
this epidemic continues on its current path, it will claim up to 650,000
49
lives due to opioid overdoses in the next ten years. This enormous
number of deaths is comparable to those attributed to HIV and AIDS over
a forty-year period.o Notwithstanding the negative impact of these
devastating drugs in recent years, the Food and Drug Administration
("FDA") continues to approve them for medical use; the newest drug,
Dsuvia, is the strongest yet, with a potency 1000-times the strength of
morphine. Such a potent drug is likely to prove more lethal and subject
to abuse than its predecessors, which have claimed more lives than any
other drug in the last two decades.5 2
B. State and FederalRegulation Regarding
the Prescriptionof Opioids
The regulation of physicians and the practice of medicine is
traditionally left to the states. 53 Regulation by state medical boards
encompasses "most aspects of the practice of medicine, including
licensure and continuing education requirements for physicians,
obtained the drugs from a doctor's prescription.").

45. William J. Ihlenfeld H, Medical Ethics and the Law: Poor PrescribingPracticesHelp Fuel
West Virginia's Drug Epidemic, W. VA. LAW., Apr.-June 2015, at 35.
46. Id. ("According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the increase in the
United States of overdoses from prescription opioids has mirrored the increase in sales of prescription

opioids.").
47.

McClure, supra note 11, at 1751.

48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 1751-52.
Id.
Id. at 1752.
Ashley May, FDA Approves Opioid Painkiller1,000 Times Stronger Than Morphine, USA

TODAY,

(Nov.

5,

2018,

11:44

AM),

https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-

now/2018/11/05/fda-approves-opioid-painkiller-stronger-than-morphine-fentynal/1889389002.
52. See id. (looking to the statement of Massachusetts Senator Ed Markey that "an opioid that
is a thousand times more powerful than morphine is a thousand times more likely to be abused, and a
thousand times more likely to kill," as well as a recent DEA "report showing that prescription drugs
were responsible for the most overdose deaths of any illicit drugs since 2001.").
53. Becky Walker James & Kathryn Lohmeyer, Painful Prescriptions:A Workable Legal
Standardfor Doctors Who Prescribe Pain Medication Has Yet to Be Established, L.A. LAW., Feb.
3
https://www.acba.org/docs/default-sourcellal-back-issues/201 -issues/february14,
at
2013,

2013.pdf.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol47/iss4/8
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maintenance of standards of professional conduct and medical practice,
and disciplinary actions against doctors found to have engaged in
unprofessional or dishonorable conduct."54 Some state medical boards
have also authored guidelines with respect to prescribing drugs and the
treatment of pain, and offer insight on how to identify drug abuse and
wean patients off of addictive painkillers."
The power to regulate the prescription of controlled substances is
split between the federal government and individual state governments.56
At the federal level, the act of prescribing is regulated by the CSA. At
the state level, individual state controlled substance acts are used to
regulate the use of controlled substances.58 When the states garner their
authority to regulate the practice of medicine from the Tenth
Amendment's police powers, the federal government retains concurrent
power to regulate controlled substances pursuant to the Commerce Clause
of the Constitution.
The CSA was passed by Congress in 1970 as Title II of the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act.o It was enacted
to regulate all controlled substances, replacing its predecessor, the
Harrison Act of 1914, the scope of which was strictly limited to
narcotics.6 1 The Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA"), which administers
and enforces the CSA, "was established in 1973 and is a unit of the FBI
within the U.S. Department of Justice." 6 2
The DEA, the FDA, and the National Institute on Drug Abuse are
responsible for oversight of the CSA's five schedules, which classify
controlled substances based on "several factors, including the potential for
abuse, the risk to public health, and the risk of psychological or
physiological dependence." 6 3 Before a new drug can be prescribed it must
be approved by the FDA for effectiveness and safety in accordance with
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act; but once approved, the FDA may not
dictate how that drug is used within the course of a physician's practice.64
54. Id.
55.

John A. Gilbert & Barbara Rowland, PracticingMedicine in a Drug Enforcement World,

in 27 HEALTH L. HANDBOOK 392,411 (2015).
56.

Barnes & Arndt, supra note 10, at 279-80.

57.
58.
59.

Id. at 279.
Id.
Id. at 280-81.

60.

Dilcher, supra note 27, at 86; see also Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control

Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1242-84.
61. Hoffman, supra note 20, at 263-64.
62. Id. at 264.
63.
64.

Dilcher, supra note 27, at 87.
See Sarah E. M. Buzzee, Comment, The Pain ReliefPromotion Act: Congress'sMisguided

Intervention of End-of-Life Care, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 217, 226-27 (2001) (discussing the FDA's role
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Schedule I substances are those deemed to have no medical use
presently, and their potential for abuse is high.65 Drugs in Schedules 1I-V
are considered to have a medical purpose and are classified based on their
potential for abuse compared to other drugs.6 6 In order to prescribe the
substances listed in Schedules II-V, a physician is required to have a DEA
registration, regardless of whether their state license allows for the
prescription of other medications.6 ' This registration requirement was
designed to allow the DEA to monitor physicians to ensure that drugs are
not diverted into illegitimate channels.6 ' However, the CSA does not
address who gets to determine "what constitutes a 'legitimate medical
purpose."' 6 9 The Supreme Court has held the view that "direct control of
medical practice in the States is beyond the power of the Federal
Government," and that "[w]hat constitutes bona fide medical practice
must be determined upon consideration of evidence and attending
circumstances"; but, "[m]ere pretense of such practice . .. cannot legalize
forbidden sales . . . ."7o To determine whether a physician lawfully
prescribed opioids for a legitimate medical purpose and within the course
of their professional practice, the courts must typically look to expert
testimony-offered by both prosecution and defendant physicians at
trial-and case-specific facts. 7 ' This is because there are no clear
guidelines for determining the scope of a physician's professional practice
that pertains to prescribing opioids.72 Unfortunately, experts in the field
hold widely varying views regarding what is appropriate when prescribing
73
opioids for the treatment of chronic pain.
Every state has regulations and statutes governing the prescription of
controlled substances, and many states observe the drug schedules
provided by the CSA.74 Most state controlled substance acts now follow
the CSA as a model and require that prescriptions for controlled
substances be "written for a legitimate medical purpose in the usual course
in the approval of new drugs).
65. Hoffman, supra note 20, at 264.
66. See John A. Gilbert, Jr., DEA Regulation of Controlled Substances and Listed Chemicals,
65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 623, 624 (2010) (discussing the scheduling of controlled substances under

the CSA).
67. Dilcher, supra note 27, at 88-89.
68.

See Buzzee, supra note 64, at 228.

69. Id.
70. Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5, 18 (1925).
71. Ihlenfeld, supra note 45, at 35-36; see also John J. Mulrooney, II & Katherine E. Legel,
CurrentNavigation Points in Drug Diversion Law: Hidden Rocks in Shallow, Murky, Drug-Infested

Waters, 101 MARQ. L. REv 333, 381-82 (2017).
72. Ihlenfeld, supra note 45, at 35-36.
73. Hoffman, supra note 20, at 270-71.
74. Dilcher, supra note 27, at 99-100.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol47/iss4/8
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of professional practice." 7 5 However, this was not always so, and it can be
drawn from this shift-from many states not recognizing legitimate
medical purpose in their statutes governing controlled substance
prescriptions in the early 2000s-that states now recognize legitimate
medical purpose in their laws in response to the opioid epidemic.76 What
constitutes prescribing "within the scope of a legitimate medical purpose"
varies from state to state, but "the general consensus is that physicians are
required to conduct a physical exam, evaluate the patient's medical
history, follow up on the efficacy of treatment, and adjust the prescription
as needed, and most importantly, physicians must document everything in
the patient's file."77 Some states further delineate the bounds of
professional practice by limiting the amount of a controlled substance that
a physician can prescribe at one time, or by restricting prescriptions
written for known abusers.
C.

Varying Applications of Section 841(a) of the CSA
Throughout the FederalCourts

For a physician to write a lawful prescription in accordance with the
CSA, it must be written for a "legitimate medical purpose" and within
"the usual course of [the physician's] professional practice."7 9
Prescriptions that do not meet these requirements are not considered
legitimate under the CSA, and, as such, prescribers who provide
illegitimate prescriptions are subject to the applicable penalties for
violating the Act.80 Although the federal circuit courts generally agree that
this is the proper standard to convict a physician for violating section
841(a) of the CSA, 8' they "have long recognized that it is not possible to
expand on the phrase 'legitimate medical purpose in the course of
professional practice,' in a way that will provide definitive guidelines that
address all of the varied situations physicians might encounter."8 2 This

75. Gilbert & Rowland, supra note 55, at 410-11.
76. Dilcher, supra note 27, at 99-100 (stating "[a]ll of the state laws permit prescriptions for
controlled substances, although, unlike federal law, most do not specifically recognize the legitimate
medical use of controlled substances."); see also Gilbert & Rowland, supra note 55, at 410-11 ("As
the prescription drug abuse epidemic continues to spread, states have attempted to follow the DEA's
lead in fighting against overprescribing.").

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Gilbert & Rowland, supra note 55, at 411.
Dilcher, supra note 27, at 100.
Goodman, supra note 24, at 221 (quoting 21 C.F.R.
Id.
Id. at 223.

82.

Hoffman, supra note 20, at 283 (quoting Dispensing Controlled Substances for the

§

1306.04(a) (2006)).

Treatment of Pain, 71 Fed. Reg. 52,715,52,717 (Sept. 6, 2006) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1306)).
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lack of a finite standard is reflected by the varying applications of section
841(a) among the federal circuit courts.83
In United States v. Moore,8 4 the Supreme Court established that
"registered physicians can be prosecuted under Section 841 [of the CSA]
when their activities fall outside the usual course of professional
practice."8 5 Moore had been charged with 639 counts of distribution or
dispensation of Schedule II methadone in violation of section 841 (a)(1)later reduced to forty counts-and was convicted on twenty-two counts,
for which he received a sentence of "concurrent terms of five to 15 years'
imprisonment on 14 counts" to run consecutively with "concurrent terms
of 10 to 30 years on the remaining eight counts," as well as, $150,000 in
fines.8 6 The trial court's conviction of Moore was reversed by the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals, which determined Moore was exempt from the
statute due to his status as a registrant under the CSA, before being
reversed by the Supreme Court. 8 7 Moore had written 11,169 prescriptions
from September 1971 to February 1972, writing over 100 prescriptions
per day on fifty-four occasions during this period, and billed his patients
on the basis of the number of pills prescribed."
Since the Supreme Court's ruling in Moore, defining what
constitutes prescribing within "the usual course of professional practice"
under section 841 of the CSA has proven difficult among the lower courts
due to the minimal guidance provided by Moore on the issue.8 9 For
determining whether a physician prescribed within the "course of
professional practice" the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals allows an
objective good faith defense, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
permits a subjective one. 90 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has
"rejected a good faith standard of intent" when faced with a physician who
"failed to ensure that his patients had a legitimate medical need and were
suited for treatment involving controlled substances." 9' To convict on
charges for "causing and aiding and abetting the illegal distribution and
83.

See James & Lohmeyer, supra note 53, at 17 (explaining the differing applications of the

standard to convict under

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

§ 841

among various circuit courts).

423 U.S. 122 (1975).
Id. at 124.
Id. at 124-25, 146.
Id. at 124.
Id. at 126.

89. See Michael C. Barnes & Stacey L. Sklaver, Active Verification and Vigilance: A Method
to Avoid Civil and Criminal Liability When Prescribing Controlled Substances, 15 DEPAUL J.
HEALTH CARE L. 93, 122 (2013) (noting that "Moore provided little guidance on this issue [of 'the
usual course of professional practice'] because the case involved a physician who abdicated all

professional responsibility").
90. Goodman, supra note 24, at 230-31.
91.

Barnes & Sklaver, supra note 89, at 127-28.
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dispensation of a controlled substance" pursuant to section 841(a)(1), the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals has found it unnecessary to provide
reference to the Moore standard. 92 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
exemplifies the difficulty of applying this standard through its application
in the cases of Dr. William Hurwitz of Virginia and Dr. Ronald McIver of
South Carolina, 93 as well as their earlier decision in United States v. Tran
Trong Cuong.94 In Tran Trong Cuong, the Fourth Circuit allowed for the
subjective good faith jury instruction that they would later deny Dr.
Hurwitz. 95 In the cases of Hurwitz and McIver, the Fourth Circuit found
that willful blindness was enough to convict physicians for "knowingly
prescribing [opioids] to patients who resell drugs," however, to very
different outcomes.96
In United States v. Tran Trong Cuong, the Fourth Circuit found that,
although the lower court had allowed the prosecution's expert to judge Dr.
Tran's prescription practices against the civil medical malpractice
standard, the evidence against Dr. Tran clearly established a violation of
section 841 in light of a jury instruction that correctly stated the criminal
standard. 9 7 The district court applied the following good faith section in
its instructions to the jury:
A doctor dispenses a drug in good faith in medically treating a patient,
then the doctor has dispensed the drug for a legitimate medical purpose
in the usual course of medical practice. That is, he has dispensed the
drug lawfully. Good faith in this context means good intentions in the
honest exercise of best professional judgment as to a patient's need. It
means the doctor acted in accordance with what he believed to be proper
medical practice. If you find the defendant acted in good faith in
dispensing the drug, then you must find him not guilty. 98

92. United States v. Singh, 390 F.3d 168, 178, 186 (2d Cir. 2004).
93. Deborah Hellman, ProsecutingDoctorsfor Trusting Patients,16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 701,
701 (2009). "Two high profile prosecutions exemplify this disturbing trend: the case of William
Hurwitz in Virginia, who was re-convicted in 2007 after a 'successful' appeal to the Fourth Circuit,
and the case of Ronald McIver of South Carolina, whose appeal to the Fourth Circuit was denied in
2006." Id.
94. 18 F.3d 1132, 1138 (4th Cir. 1994).
95. United States v. Hurwitz, 459 F.3d 463, 478-80 (4th Cir. 2006) (discussing why the
subjective good faith jury instruction applied in Tran Trong Cuong was inappropriate in the present
case and that the district court did not err in denying its application to Dr. Hurwitz).
96. Hellman, supra note 93, at 701 ("Both men were sentenced to federal prison, with Dr.
Hurwitz receiving a sentence of fifty-seven months and McIver receiving a sentence of thirty years.
In each case, the court instructed the jury that it could convict the doctor under a statute that prohibits
knowingly prescribing to patients who resell drugs if the jury found merely that the physician was
willfully blind to this fact.").
97. Tran Trong Cuong, 18 F.3d at 1137-39.
98. Id. at 1138.
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The district court convicted Dr. Tran for violating section 841 of the
CSA, 99 and in doing so, supplied the following elements for his charges:
"(1) that Dr. Tran distributed or dispensed a controlled substance, (2) that
he acted knowingly and intentionally, and (3) that his actions were not for
legitimate medical purposes in the usual course of his professional
medical practice or beyond the bounds of medical practice." 0 0 The Fourth
Circuit acknowledged that the district court's application of the "without
a legitimate medical purpose" standard was stricter than that applied in
Moore, but permissible nonetheless, and beneficial to Dr. Tran. 0'o
The Fourth Circuit reversed the conviction of Dr. Tran on all 127
counts against him, 10 2 and instructed that Dr. Tran could not be retried on
eighty counts related to twenty patients who had each been issued four
prescriptions by Dr. Tran because the patients did not testify; rather, the
evidence for these counts was offered by the prosecution's expert, 03 and
was therefore insufficient to convict. 1 04 The other counts against Dr. Tran
were reversed because of an evidentiary issue and could still be retried.o
Despite its reversal, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that the
evidence against Dr. Tran was sufficient such that a jury could have
reasonably found that he had violated section 841(a)(1).1 0 6 The evidence
against Dr. Tran indicated he would prescribe controlled substances for
relatively minor conditions that would not typically require treatment with
a controlled substance, and he would maintain patients on this course of
treatment for sometimes years at a time without follow-up examinations
or additional testing. 107 Dr. Tran had also prescribed controlled substances
to patients who were clearly addicts, including some Dr. Tran knew to be
getting drugs from other physicians, patients exhibiting drug-seeking
behavior, and an admittedly addicted patient exhibiting needle marks. 0 8
In United States v. Hurwitz,109 the Fourth Circuit concluded that
"good faith is relevant to § 841 charges against a registered physician"
when it vacated Dr. Hurwitz's convictions and remanded the case for the
district court's failure to give a good faith jury instruction before
convicting Dr. Hurwitz." 0 In Hurwitz, the Fourth Circuit applied the same
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 1133.
Id. at 1141.
Id. at 1138.
Id. at 1144.
Id. at 1135.
Id. at 1144.
Id. at 1141, 1144.
Id. at 1141.
Id. at 1139.
Id. at 1139-40.
459 F.3d 463 (4th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 482-83.
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essential elements for a section 841 violation that it had in Tran Trong
Cuong."' Nonetheless, the Fourth Circuit rejected the application of
Hurwitz's requested subjective good faith instruction and asserted that the
correct instruction would be an objective one, accounting for generally
accepted medical standards.' 12 The good faith instruction requested by
Hurwitz was "essentially identical"ll 3 to that applied in Tran Trong
Cuong,114 however, the Fourth Circuit justified its divergence from this
earlier decision on the basis that Dr. Tran's good faith was not at issue,
and its explanation that in Tran Trong Cuong "the portion of the
instructions that included the good-faith instructions were broader than
necessary to comply with Moore.""'5 The instruction supplied in Tran
Trong Cuong applied good faith in the context of the legitimate medical
purpose element.1 16 However, the Fourth Circuit found that the more
appropriate standard was an objective one-targeted at the course of
professional practice element-because to allow a subjective standard
would permit physicians to disregard accepted canons of medicine and
treat patients by any chosen means, as long as the physician believed the
treatment was appropriate for a recognized medical purpose.1 17
Hurwitz had been convicted by the district court of "forty-six counts
of drug trafficking" under section 841(a) of the CSA for his high-dose
opioid approach to pain management." 8 One expert for the government
testified that the dosages prescribed by Hurwitz far-exceeded the accepted
111.

Id. at 475 (citing to Tran Trong Cuong, among other cases, in support of the elements quoted

from United States v. Singh, 54 F.3d 1182, 1187 (4th Cit. 1995): "we have held that to convict a
doctor for violating § 841, the government must prove: (1) 'that the defendant distributed or dispensed
a controlled substance'; (2) that the defendant 'acted knowingly and intentionally'; and (3) 'that the
defendant's actions were not for legitimate medical purposes in the usual course of his professional
medical practice or were beyond the bounds of medical practice."'); cf. supra text accompanying note
100 (discussing the elements of a charge under § 841 of the CSA as applied in Tran Trong Cuong).

112.
113.

Hurwitz, 459 F.3d at 479.
Id.

114. Id. at 478-79. Hurwitz requested the following instruction, almost identical to the subjective
good faith instruction afforded in Tran Trong Cuong:
If a doctor dispenses a drug in good faith to-medically treat a patient, then the
doctor has dispensed the drug for a legitimate medical purpose and in the
course of medical practice. That is, he has dispensed the drug lawfully. 'Good
faith' in this context means good intentions in the honest exercise of best
professional judgment as to a patient's needs. It means the doctor acted
according to what he believed to be proper medical practice.
Id. at 479 (emphasis added); cf. supra, text accompanying note 98 (discussing the lower court in Tran
Trong Cuong instruction to the jury on the standard of good faith).
115. Hurwitz,459 F.3d at 479; see also supratext accompanying note 101 (discussing the Fourth
Circuit's application of the "without a legitimate medical purpose" standard).

116.
117.

Hurwitz, 459 F.3d at 479.
Id.

118. Id. at 467-68. Hurwitz was also "convicted of . . one count of drug trafficking resulting in
death, [and] two counts of drug trafficking resulting in serious bodily injury" under the same. Id.
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dosages of 195-350 milligrams of morphine or its equivalent accepted
among practitioners for high-dose opioid therapy, where Hurwitz had
been prescribing a median daily dosage of 2000 milligrams to patients
from 1998-2002.119 Hurwitz and his witnesses testified that these dosages
were appropriate because "the body quickly develops resistance to the
dangerous side-effects of opioids (such as respiratory depression), which
then permits an escalation of the dosage until pain relief is obtained," and
that once the body has built up such a resistance there is no limit to the
"quantity of opioids that can be prescribed if necessary to control pain.," 2 0
In United States v. McIver,1 2 1 the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
conviction of Dr. Ronald McIver for various violations of the CSA,
22
McIver
including seven counts in violation of section 841(a)(1).1
for
which
pain,
of
chronic
operated a clinic specializing in the treatment
McIver "had prescribed massive quantities of [addictive Schedule II
opioids including] oxycodone, Dilaudid, OxyContin, methadone, and
morphine."l 2 3 The charges against McIver resulted from his treatment of
ten patients, one of whom was deceased, with the other nine testifying at
trial. 12 4 In order to convict McIver on the counts pursuant to section
841(a)(1), the jury was charged to fmd that the government had proven
"(1) that Appellant knowingly or intentionally distributed a controlled
substance; (2) with knowledge that it was controlled under the law;1 and
25
(3) that he did so 'outside the usual course of professional practice."'
On appeal, McIver only challenged the instructions given for element
three of his charges.1 2 6 Contrary to McIver's assertion "that by referring
to 'norms of professional practice' in the jury instructions, the district
court improperly allowed the jury to convict on a civil, rather than a
criminal, standard of proof," the Fourth Circuit found that when viewed
together in their entirety, the jury instructions applied by the district court
"adequately articulated a criminal standard of proof." 2 7 Reviewing these
instructions, the Fourth Circuit found numerous reasons that the given
instructions set forth the appropriate criminal standard:1 28 (1) the lower
court had properly articulated the government's "beyond a reasonable
doubt" burden of proof as encompassing the entire charge; (2) the district
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 467.
Id. at 468.
470 F.3d 550 (4th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 552-53.
Id. at 552-53, 553 nn.3-7.
Id. at 553.
Id. at 556 (quoting United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 124 (1975)); cf. supra note 111.
Id. at 556, n. 9.
Id. at 557-58.
Id. at 559.
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court had properly defined the scope of conduct prohibited under section
841 as using the "authority to prescribe controlled substances" to do so
"outside the course of professional practice"-the threshold required by
Moore-and "for other than a legitimate medical purpose," thus,
arguably benefitting McIver "by placing a heavier burden on the
government than otherwise required to establish criminal liability";12 9 (3)
that a good faith instruction was provided, noting that good faith is not an
applicable defense for medical malpractice but is for charges stemming
from section 841;130 and (4) that the district court had sufficiently
explained to the jury the differences between convicting on a civil
standard compared to convicting on a criminal standard.' 3 1

129. Id. at 559.
For you to find that the government has proven this essential element, you must
determine that the government has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant was acting outside the bounds of professional medical practice, as
his authority to prescribe controlled substances was being used not for
treatment of a patient, but for the purpose of assisting another in the
maintenance of a drug habit or dispensing controlled substances for other than
a legitimate medical purpose, in other words, the personal profit of the
physician. Put another way, the government must prove as to each count
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant dispensed the specific controlled
substance other than for a legitimate medical purpose and not with the bounds
of professional medical practice.
Id. at 557; cf. supra text accompanying note 125 (discussing the jury instructions provided pursuant
to 841(a)(1)).
130. Hurwitz, 459 F.3d at 559-60.
If a doctor dispenses a drug in good faith, in medically treating a patient, then
the doctor has dispensed that drug for a legitimate medical purpose in the usual
course of medical practice. That is, he has dispensed the drug lawfully. Good
faith in this context means good intentions, and the honest exercise of
professional judgment as to the patient's needs. It means that the defendant
acted in accordance with what he reasonably believed to be proper medical
practice. If you find that a defendant acted in good faith in dispensing the drugs
charged in this indictment, then you must find that defendant not guilty.
Id. at 556, n. 9.; cf. supra note 114.
131. McIver, 470 F.3d at 560.
There has been some mention in this case from time to time of the standard of
care. During the trial the words medical malpractice may have been used.
Those words relate to civil actions. When you go to see a doctor, as a patient,
that doctor must treat you in a way so as to meet the standard of care that
physicians of similar training would have given you under the same or similar
circumstances. And if they fall below that line or what a reasonable physician
would have done, then they have not exercised that standard of care, which
makes them negligent and which subjects them to suits for malpractice. That
is not what we're talking about. We're not talking about this physician acting
better or worse than other physicians. We're talking about whether or not this
physician prescribed a controlled substance outside the bounds of his
professional medical practice.
Id. at 556-57.
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The Fourth Circuit also found that the district court had not erred by
allowing the prosecution's expert to testify that Mclver had "treated
patients outside the course of legitimate medical practice," which McIver
argued, amounted to "inadmissible legal conclusions." Additionally, the
court determined that the district court had not erred in its decision that
allowing McIver's expert to testify to "whether a minority group of
doctors who treat pain aggressively with opioids acted 'within the bounds
of medical practice,"' was an impermissible legal conclusion. 13 2 The court
determined that the language employed by the prosecution's expert fell
"within the limited vernacular that is available to express whether a doctor
acted outside the bounds of his professional practice," and that the
testimony of McIver's witness that was allowed was similar enough to the
line of questioning denied, making any possible error harmless.1 3 3
In UnitedStates v. Feingold,13 4 the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower
court's conviction of Dr. Jeffrey Feingold-a naturopathic physician
practicing in Arizona--on 185 counts of unlawful distribution in violation
of section 841(a) of the CSA.1 3 5 Feingold argued that the lower court had
improperly admitted expert testimony opining to the national standard of
care regarding opioid prescribing and in doing so misled the jury and
allowed them to convict him on a finding of negligence, thus conflating
the criminal and civil standards of liability.1 3 6 Additionally, Feingold
argued that the instructions provided to the jury did not supply the
requisite intent for a criminal conviction."' Feingold copiously prescribed
large quantities of various drugs, including the opioids Percocet,
hydrocodone, Vicodin, oxycodone, and Oxycontin, providing refills as
early as one to two days from the initial prescription.' 38 In one instance,
Feingold wrote twenty-eight oxycodone and Oxycontin prescriptions for
a single patient over the course of a month, with each prescription totaling
120 pills.1 3 9 In another instance "he prescribed as many as 2,000 pills in a
single month, despite the fact that the recommended maximum dosage
would have allowed the consumption of only 186, to a patient who
testified that he resold the pills to others." 4 0
The Ninth Circuit agreed with Feingold's assertion that it was
improper to convict under section 841(a) of the CSA for only a finding
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id.
Id.
454 F.3d 1001 (9th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 1004, 1014.
Id. at 1005-07.
Id. at 1007.
Id. at 1004-05.
Id. at 1004.
Id. at 1004-05.
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that a physician did not prescribe in accordance with the standard of care,
but disagreed that having an expert testify to the standard was "irrelevant
or prejudicial."l4 1 The Ninth Circuit found that such testimony was
offered to determine that a physician prescribed without a legitimate
medical purpose outside the course of professional practice and that
"[k]nowing how doctors generally ought to act is essential for a jury to
determine whether a practitioner has acted not as a doctor, or even as a
bad doctor, but as a 'pusher' whose conduct is without a legitimate
medical justification." 4 2
The Ninth Circuit also agreed with Feingold that the jury must be
charged to look to the subjective intent of the prescriber and find that his
actions were intentional to convict under section 841.143 Despite their
agreement, the Ninth Circuit found that, taken as a whole, the instructions
provided by the district court adequately charged the jury to examine
Feingold's intent, having made at least four references to his "state of
mind."1 44 The Ninth Circuit determined that "any imprecision in the jury
instructions as to the standard for criminal liability was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt," and that the evidence against Feingold was sufficient
to affirm his conviction.145 However, the Ninth Circuit vacated and
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. at 1007.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1006, 1008-09. The district court also provided the following good faith instruction

to the jury:
A controlled substance is distributed by a practitioner in the usual course of his

professional practice if the substance is distributed by him in good faith in
medically treating a patient. Good faith is not merely a practitioner's sincere
intention towards the people who come to see him, but, rather, it involves his
sincerity in attempting to conduct himself in accordance with a standard of
medical practice generally recognized and accepted in the country. Thus, good
faith in this context means an honest effort to prescribe for a patient's condition
in accordance with the standard of medical practice generally recognized and
accepted in the country. However, practitioners who act outside the usual
course of professional practice and prescribe or distribute controlled substances
for no legitimate medical purpose may be guilty of unlawful distribution of
controlled substances.

Id. at 1006; cf. supra note 130.
145. Feingold, 454 F.3d at 1012.
The evidence against Dr. Feingold was overwhelming. He prescribed drugs to
people whom he knew to be addicts, to people whom he had never examined,
to people whom he had never met, and to undercover law enforcement officials
who did little more than tell him they wanted narcotics. He continued to
prescribe Schedule II narcotics even after the state of Arizona had made it
illegal for naturopathic physicians to do so, and after local pharmacists had

specifically refused to fill some of his prescriptions because he lacked
authorization to write them. Further, he dispensed drugs in quantities that,
according to the government's experts, probably would have killed his patients,
and certainly would have destroyed their livers, if they had actually consumed
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remanded his twelve-year sentence because the district court had
14 6
erroneously assumed the guidelines used were mandatory.
In United States v. Merrill,14 7 the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the district court's conviction of Dr. Thomas Merrill on ninetyeight out of 100 counts-among other charges including wire and health
care fraud-seventy-five of which were for "illegally prescribing
narcotics outside the course of professional practice under the Controlled
Substances Act," and nine of which "alleged that death resulted from
either the health care fraud or the use of the narcotics prescribed outside
the course of professional practice." 4 8 The district court relied on the
testimony of an expert in the fields of prescribing controlled substances
and pain management, who categorized the prescribing practices of Dr.
Merrill as "unbelievable," "ill-advised," "an invitation to disaster,"
"astonishing," and
"inconceivable,"
"bizarre,"
"inappropriate,"
"incredible," based on his review of records for eighty of Dr. Merrill's
patients. 14 9 Five of Merrill's patients died from overdoses and their
autopsies revealed drugs that Merrill had prescribed them within the three
weeks preceding their deaths, and three of these patients had pill bottles
from prescriptions issued by Merrill nearby when their bodies were
found.' 50 Merrill had written over 33,000 prescriptions from January 2001
to May 2004, 99.4% of which were written for controlled substances.'
Out of the prescriptions for controlled substances, 81% were for
Diazepam (5907 prescriptions), Alprazolam (4326 prescriptions), and a
total of 16869 prescriptions for the opioids hydrocodone and
3
oxycodone. 152 Merrill received six concurrent life sentences.1 5
In UnitedStates v. Pellmann,15 4 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
found that expert testimony was not necessary to affirm the district court's

the drugs in the amounts he prescribed. Moreover, Dr. Feingold repeatedly
admitted during his testimony that his practice of prescribing controlled
substances was 'outside the course of professional practice' . . . claim[ing] that
he was an incompetent doctor who was honestly trying to help his patients
manage pain, [and] didn't know that they were abusing drugs due to his lack
of training about the use of opioids, and never intended to flout professional
protocol.

Id. at 1012-13.
146. Id. at 1013-14.
147. 513 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2008).
148. Id. at 1297.
149. Id. at 1297-98.
150. Id. at 1298-99; cf. supra note 145.
151. Merrill,513 F.3d at 1299-1300; cf. supra note 145.
152. Merrill,513 F.3d at 1300; cf. supra note 145.
153. Merrill,513 F.3d at 1297.
154. 668 F.3d 918 (7th Cir. 2012).
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conviction of Pellmann under section 841(a) of the CSA.155 Pellmann, a
Wisconsin radiologist, used fentanyl-a short-acting Schedule II opioid
100-times the strength of morphine-to treat his patients' pain. 15 6 The
DEA began investigating Pellmann after he ordered over 7000 units of
fentanyl in 2009.157 He had ordered 260 units or less in the four preceding
years.15 8 The DEA's investigation uncovered that a large percentage of
these fentanyl prescriptions were issued to a nurse at Pellmann's clinicJacquelynn Evans-who Pellmann allegedly treated for trigeminal
neuralgia, 5 9 of which he kept no records.1 60
Pellmann challenged his conviction under section 841(a) on the
ground that the government had not offered expert testimony to establish
that he had acted outside of the course of professional practice, and he
attempted to distinguish his actions from that of a "drug pusher" because
his charge arose from interactions with only one patient. 16 1 In light of the
evidence against Pellmann, 162 the Seventh Circuit found that:
155. Id. at 919.
156. Id. at 920.
157. Id. Pellmann also ordered a large amount of morphine in 2009, after having ordered none
in the years preceding. Id.

158.
159.

Id.
Id. at 920-22.
At trial, Evans testified that Pellmann began administering fentanyl in March
2009 to treat severe mouth pain stemming from a fractured tooth, which
Pellmann diagnosed as trigeminal neuralgia and described as the 'suicide
disease,' because of the high rates of suicide associated with the condition....
[H]e also provided fentanyl for Evans to administer to herself.

Id. at 921-22.
160. Id. at 921.
161. Id. at 923-24.
162. Id. at 924-25.
Obviously, the facts here do not fall within these more common 'drug pusher'
cases: Pellmann was not charged with prescribing controlled substances to
hundreds of patients, conducting perfunctory examinations, or issuing cookiecutter prescriptions. Still, there was certainly ample evidence, considered
together, for a reasonable jury to determine that Pellmann acted outside of his
professional practice and not for a legitimate medical purpose, including: (1)
during 2009, Pellmann ordered 30 times his previous average, annual needs of
fentanyl and morphine for his entire practice, all of the excess going to Evans;
(2) Pellmann regularly administered fentanyl and morphine to Evans at her
home and at Pellmann's home, both of which resembled (for lack of a better
description) drug houses; (3) Pellmann maintained no records of distribution
of drugs to Evans or his treatment of her, including his apparently concocted
diagnosis of trigeminal neuralgia; (4) Pellmann's treatment of Evans was

wholly outside his use of fentanyl and morphine in his professional practice;
(5) Pellmann's employees were kept in the dark about his claimed treatment of
Evans; and (6) following his arrest and initial arraignment, Pellmann again took
Evans to a hotel and administered drugs in direct violation of a court
order. ... [T]his evidence is not only sufficient to support the jury's
conviction, it is overwhelming.
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[W]hile expert testimony might have aided the jury and the district court
would not have erred by admitting such testimony if offered by either
party-the government was not required to present expert testimony,
especially in light of overwhelming evidence of Pellmann's
unprecedented and undocumented prescriptions of profoundly addicting
and potent painkillers, which he personally administered in multiple,
private houses and hotel rooms Pellmann shared with Evans for longterm treatment of a condition he was unqualified to diagnose and did not
treat in his own area of practice. Similarly, while Pellmann was allowed
to opine that Evans' claimed medical condition justified this drug
regimen, the jury had an ample evidentiary basis to reject it, even
163
without contrary expert opinion.
In United States v. Singh,1 64 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the conviction of Dr. Arvinder Singh on various charges relating
to his medical practice, including "twenty-four counts of causing and
aiding and abetting the illegal distribution and dispensation of controlled
substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2."l65
Singh operated a pain management clinic out of Albany Memorial
66
Hospital but was often not in the clinic to treat patients.1 Although Singh
employed other physicians in his practice, and nurses are not permitted by
law to write prescriptions for Schedule II drugs, by pre-signingsometimes entire books of-triplicate prescription forms, and having his
nursing staff fill in the requisite prescription information later, Singh was
able to issue prescriptions for controlled substances even when he was not
67
present in the clinic.
Despite Singh's contention "that the District Court 'wrote the
essential element of distributing out of the statute and the indictment' in
giving the [jury] instruction," the Second Circuit found that the provided
instructions correctly set forth the requisite elements constituting "the
substantive crime of illegally distributing or dispensing a controlled
substance." 6 8 The Second Circuit concluded that the district court
Id. (emphasis added); cf. supra text accompanying notes 150-51 (discussing the facts of Merrillwhere
the doctor wrote over 30,000 prescriptions for controlled substances in a three-year period).

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Pellmann, 668 F.3d at 926.
390 F.3d 168 (2d Cir. 2004).
Id. at 178, 194.
Id. at 175.
Id. at 176.
Id. at 184-85. The challenged portion of the jury instruction stated:
In order to prove that a person violated Title 21, United States Code, Section
841 (a)(1) as set forth in those counts, 42 through 65, the substantive crime of
illegally distributing or dispensing a controlled substance, the Government
must prove-must establish beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following
elements that make up the crime. Three elements are, first, the drugs prescribed
were Schedule II Controlled Substances; second, the drugs were prescribed;
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permissibly substituted the term "prescribed" for "distributing and
dispensing," as the charges stemmed from illegal prescriptions.16 9 The
Second Circuit also noted that the district court did not err by convicting
Singh "without reference to the standard in Moore [where] he caused and
aided and abetted the distribution or dispensation by others not authorized
to do so."1 7 0 The Court of Appeals found that Singh's contention regarding
the Moore standard, had, in fact, been accommodated in the following
portion of the jury instruction afforded:

'

If, however you find that it was defendant Singh who prescribed the
schedule I controlled substances, then you should consider whether
defendant Singh did so "in the usual course of medical practice" and
"for a legitimate medical purpose." In other words you must determine
whether defendant Singh acted in good faith. Good faith in this context
means with reasonable and good intentions and the honest exercise of
best professional judgment as to a patient's needs; that is, that defendant
Singh acted in accordance with what he reasonably believed to be proper
medical practice. The Government bears the burden of proving the lack
of good faith beyond a reasonable doubt.' 7
The Second Circuit also found that Singh was appropriately charged
as a principal pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2, maintaining that someone who
aids and abets a section 841(a)(1) offense is still in violation of the CSA.1 7 2
Further, the court found that Singh's contention to this respect, that the
jury had been allowed to convict him of offenses not indicated in the
indictment, was without merit where, "[t]he indictment charged him with
pre-signing the triplicate prescription forms that his nurses later used
illegally to distribute and dispense specific controlled substances to
individual patients"; the evidence before the district court adequately
proved the charges; and the jury was instructed:
[Y]ou may find defendant Singh guilty of the offense charged if you find
beyond a reasonable doubt that the Government has proven that another
person actually committed the offense with which defendant Singh is
charged and that defendant Singh caused and/or aided or abetted that
person in the commission of the offense. 173

and third, that the person who prescribed the Schedule II Controlled Substances
knowingly prescribed them and was not authorized to do to [sic].
Id. at 185; cf. supra text accompanying notes 143-44 (discussing the jury instructions provided in

Feingold).
169. Singh, 390 F.3d at 185.
170. Id. at 186.
171.

Id.; cf. supra note 144 (discussing the good faith instruction provided in Feingold).

172.
173.

Singh, 390 F.3d at 186-87.
Id.
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Although there is currently no definitive standard for what
constitutes a physician's "course of professional practice" under section
841(a) of the CSA, 174 the cases noted in this Subpart highlight various
prescribing practices that are symptomatic of a physician's divergence
175 Such practices include
from his or her respective course of practice.
17 6
writing an
billing a patient based on the number of opioids prescribed;
exorbitant number of opioid prescriptions, or prescriptions for large
17 7
quantities of pills, over an unusually short period of time; prescribing
doses of opioids well-beyond those accepted by other prescribers for the
prescribing opioids for minor ailments that do not
same purpose;
9
typically require opioids for treatment; 17 maintaining a patient on an
opioid regimen for an extended period without additional examination or
testing; so prescribing opioids to patients who are obviously addicted;18 1
pre-signing prescriptions;1 82 and having multiple patients overdose and
18 3
die due to opioids the physician prescribed. The circuits do not disagree
that bad behavior by physicians is indicative of a section 84 1(a) violation,
rather, the divergence exists around the elements of knowledge and good
faith. 184 Regardless of whether a physician is held to an objective or
subjective good faith standard, or whether a physician's willful blindness
will supplant the knowledge requirement,"' a physician charged with
violating section 841(a) is normally judged in-light of objective evidence
that is supported by expert opinion, and used to quantify the prescribing
at-issue as either in or outside of the course of the physician's personal
professional practice.186 Thus, by constraining the situations in which
physicians can prescribe opioids in good faith, states can narrow what
constitutes a physician's course of professional practice with respect to
187
prescribing opioids.

174. Hoffman, supra note 20, at 283-84.
175.
176.

See supra Part II.C.
See supra text accompanying note 88.

177. See supra text accompanying notes 88, 138-39, 151-52, 163.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

supra text accompanying
supra text accompanying
supra text accompanying
supra text accompanying
supra text accompanying
supra text accompanying
supra notes 90-91, 95-96
supra text accompanying
supra text accompanying

note 119.
note 107.
note 107.
note 108.
note 167.
note 150.
and accompanying text.
notes 90, 96.
note 71.

187. See infra Part III.
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III. PERMISSIVE FEDERAL GUIDELINES AND STATE STATUTES AND
THEIR IMPLICATIONS ON THE COURSE OF PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE FOR
PRESCRIBING OPIOIDS TO TREAT PAIN
Typically, whether or not a physician's prescription practices are
found to violate the CSA is determined by competing expert testimony.1 8
Nonetheless, certain instances-where physician misconduct is so
obvious that it denotes an utter lack of a legitimate medical purpose for
the prescription issued-lend themselves to a jury determination without
such expert testimony.' 8 9 In essence, juries are left to make medical
judgments as to the boundary separating the practice of medicine and pill
pushing and to determine whether or not the physician crossed that line.'
The treatment of pain is undeniably held by the scientific and medical
communities as a legitimate medical purpose for the prescription of
opioids.191 However, differentiating lawful and unlawful prescribing
under the CSA is particularly perplexing due to pain's intangible nature
and the varying views on how to properly treat it.1 9 2 Pain's subjectivity
requires that physicians rely on patient declarations of pain and
incorporate their assessments into their patient's treatment.1 9 3
Additionally, the unclear and arguably subjective "usual course of his
professional practice" dictated by Section 1306.04(a) of the Code of
Federal Regulations, in regards to prosecuting prescribers under Section
841 of the CSA, has not yielded a clear-cut rule among the courts in its
application.' 94 Subpart A of this section will explore non-authoritative
guidelines offered by the DEA and CDC regarding the prescription of
opioids.1 9 5 Subpart B examines state statutes from Washington and New
York that provide mandatory guidelines with regard to prescribing opioids
and help narrow the scope of what constitutes the course of professional
practice for prescribing opioids.1 9 6
188. Gilbert & Rowland, supra note 55, at 401.
189. Id. at 401-02.
190.

See James & Lohmeyer, supra note 53, at 17.
Inasmuch as the CSA 'conveys an unwillingness to cede medical judgments to
an executive official who lacks medical expertise,' it follows that Congress
cannot have intended to cede juries medical judgments about the legitimacy of
prescribing pain medications to patients who report pain to their doctors. Yet
this is precisely what jurors are asked to do in cases involving doctors accused
of prescribing medications without a legitimate medical purpose. Jurors are
asked to find the line between practicing medicine and pushing pills.

Id.
191. See id. at 16 (discussing the recognition by the medical and science communities of the
legitimate medical use of opiate analgesics to treat pain, as reflected in the Business and Professions

Code of California).
192.
193.

Goodman, supra note 24, at 223-24.
See Dilcher,supranote 27, at 117-18 (discussing that the subjective nature of pain interferes
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PermissiveNational PrescribingGuidelines:
A Noble Attempt but PowerlessNonetheless

At the state level, "there is [currently] no consistent and cohesive
1 7
Attempts to clarify
approach" to the regulation of opioid prescribing.
been made by
have
opioids
to
proper prescription practices with respect
99
98
both the FDAl and the CDC.1 These guidelines are permissive and
simply serve as suggestions for what constitutes proper prescribing
practices. 2 0 0 Alternatively, states such as Washington and New York have
adopted regulatory schemes that state mandatory guidelines for
prescribing opioids, and in doing so, have defined some aspects of the
appropriate course of professional practice for prescribing opioids to their
respective populations.20 1
1. FDA Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies and
Evidence-Based Guidelines
Through the passage of the of the Food and Drug Administration
Amendments Act of 2007 ("FDAAA"), Congress granted the FDA the
power to implement Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies
("REMS"), through which the FDA can require pharmaceutical
companies "to propose strategies to mitigate certain risks of drugs that
20 2
This
have high or suspected high risk of abuse and overdose."
Congressional grant does not, however, give the FDA any authority over
203
physicians as to how they may prescribe a drug, but does allow the FDA
to require prescribers to register with the FDA, in addition to their
registering with the DEA.2 04 Additionally, the FDA can use REMS that
require pharmaceutical companies to provide patient-labeling inserts,
with its incorporation into the practice of medicine because physicians rely on objective tests to assess
pain).

§

194. Hellman, supra note 93, at 707-08 (discussing how applying the standard set forth by
1306.04(a) as it pertains to prosecuting physicians under § 841 of the CSA has proven difficult and

garnered a number of interpretations among the circuit courts).

195. See infra Part III.A.
196. See infra Part III.B.
197. Angelo J. Cifaldi & Lisa English Hinkle, Regulations and Policies Affecting a Physician's
PrescribingAuthority, 2016 AHLA SEMINAR PAPERS 2,9 (Feb. 8, 2016).

198. See infra Part M.A.1.
199.
200.

Dowell et al., supra note 17.
See infra text accompanying note 203, 228.

201. N.Y. Pub. Health Law
at 10.
202.

§ 3331(5)(b)

(McKinney 2018); Cifaldi & Hinkle, supra note 197,

Barnes & Arndt, supra note 10, at 296.

203. Id. at 297-98.
204. Christopher J. Frisina, Let FDA Regulate Its Own Drugs!: An Argument for Narcotic
Control and Enforcement Under the Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS), 27 LOY.
CONSUMER L. REV. 238, 265 (2015).
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medication guides, and provider communication plans-via conference
presentation, mail, or some other means-to both patients and providers
to inform them of the risks associated with a particular FDA-approved
drug. 2 0 5
The FDAAA allows the FDA to condition its approval of a subject
drug on a drug manufacturer's submission of REMS reports that require
"such elements as are necessary to assure the safe use of the drug,"
including: (1) that a prescriber have specific training, experience, or
certification; (2) special certification of pharmacies; (3) setting in which
the drug can be dispensed; (4) dispensation to patients upon evidence of
safe use; (5) patient monitoring; and (6) patient enrollment in a drug
registry.20 6 This provision is notable because on September 18, 2018, the
FDA approved the new REMS for opioid analgesics that cover
immediate-release opioids for outpatient-use-which had not been
previously covered-and long-acting and extended-release opioids.2 07
This is the first time the REMS program is requiring that "training be
made available to health care providers who are involved in the
management of patients with pain, and not only to prescribers." 2 0 8
The REMS is also requiring that a wider range of information,
including opioid alternatives, be covered by the education. 2 0 9 The FDA's
goal for this new REMS "is to reduce unnecessary and/or inappropriate
exposure to opioids by making certain that Health Care Providers
("HCPs") are properly informed about appropriate prescribing
recommendations, that HCPs understand how to identify abuse by
individual patients, and know how to get patients with opioid use disorder
into treatment." 2 10 However, this REMS's requirements pertain to
pharmaceutical companies and prescribers are not actually required to do
205. Id. at 263.
206. Id.; see also 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(f) (2018). In regard to the prescriber training, experience,
or certification elements of these REMS, section 355-1(f)(3)(A) specifically states:
[H]ealth care providers who prescribe the drug have particular training or
experience, or are specially certified (the opportunity to obtain such training or
certification with respect to the drug shall be available to any willing provider
from a frontier area in a widely available training or certification method
(including an on-line course or via mail) as approved by the Secretary at
reasonable cost to the provider).

21 U.S.C.

§ 355-1(f)(3)(A).

207. FDA Takes ImportantSteps to Encourage Appropriateand RationalPrescribingof Opioids
Through Final Approval of New Safety Measures Governing the Use of Immediate-Release Opioid
Analgesic Medications, FED. DRUG ADMIN. (Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/newsevents/press-announcements/fda-takes-important-steps-encourage-appropriate-and-rational-

prescribing-opioids-through-final.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210.

OpioidAnalgesic Risk Evaluation,supra note 44.
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anything in accordance with the new REMS to prescribe opioids, although
the FDA is currently considering the pursuit of mandatory education and
how to effectuate it.2 1 1

In regard to this voluntary training, the FDA has outlined the desired
learning objectives for providers who prescribe opioids, in its FDA
Education Blueprintfor HealthcareProvidersInvolved in the Treatment
and Monitoring of Patients with Pain ("Blueprint").2 12 This document
discusses the importance of continued provider education in light of the
current opioid epidemic,2 13 as well as the purpose of this REMS
education. 214 The Blueprint acknowledges the competing public health
problems associated with prescription opioids-the adequate treatment of
patients with chronic pain and the opioid epidemic-and provides
recommendations with regard to patient assessments prior to
1
215
creating pain treatment plans,2 16 and managing patients
prescription,
who are prescribed opioids for pain.217 In regard to patient assessments,
the Blueprint urges that providers know how to make effective
assessments of patients before initiating a pain management program and
that such assessments should include:
(1) Patient history; (2) Screening tools to evaluate the known risk factors
for the development of chronic pain after an acute injury or disease; (3)
Screening tools to evaluate the known risk factors for opioid use
disorder (OUD) or abuse; (4) Queries of state prescription drug
monitoring programs (PDMPs); (5) Pain assessment scales/tools; (6)
Functional assessment scales; (7) Physical examination; (8) Family
planning, including information about use of contraceptives, pregnancy,
211. Id.
There is no mandatory federal requirement that prescribers or other HCPs take
the training and no precondition to prescribing or dispensing opioid analgesics
to patients. However, the FDA's Opioid Policy Steering Committee continues
to consider whether there are circumstances when the FDA should require
some form of mandatory education for HCPs, and how the agency would
pursue such a goal.

Id.
212.

See Monitoring of Patientswith Pain,supra note 44, at 1.

213.

Id. at 2-3.
Adverse outcomes of addiction, unintentional overdose, and death resulting
from inappropriate prescribing, abuse, and misuse of opioids have emerged as

major public health problems. It is critical that HCPs are knowledgeable about
the risks associated with opioid analgesics as they pertain to their patients as
well as from a public health perspective. The data continue to show problems
associated with prescription opioid analgesics.

Id. at 2.
214. Id. at 4.
215. Id. at 5.
216. Id. at 6.
217.

Id. at 10.
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intent/status and plans to breastfeed; (9) Psychological and social
218
evaluation; [and] (10) Diagnostic studies when indicated.
With respect to patient management, the Blueprint lists things for
providers to consider before initiating opioid treatment for both acute and
chronic pain, as well as ongoing and long-term management of patients'
pain. 219 Some notable considerations for initiating treatment include
consulting a prescription drug monitoring program ("PDMP") before
initiating treatment and weighing risks and appropriate dosing to treat pain
for its expected duration. 2 2 0 For long-term and ongoing patient
management the considerations provided in the Blueprint sound in the
tune of review, calling for a recurring review of the patient goals; review
of PDMPs; evaluation of patients for opioid use disorder; and
"[m]onitoring patient adherence to the treatment plan, especially
regarding misuse and abuse."22 1 The Blueprint also specifies that
physicians should know how to wean patients off of opioids and the
associated risks, and should be able to identify withdrawal symptoms and
know how to manage them.222
Although the FDA Blueprint recognizes the areas in which
prescribers "should be knowledgeable," it does not provide any of the
actual knowledge a prescriber should have when treating a patient with
opioids-that is, it does not state what dose should actually be used in a
given situation-and is arguably rendered less effective by the fact that
this education is voluntary. 2 2 3 However, in a statement made on August
22, 2018, the FDA Commissioner, Scott Gottlieb, M.D., acknowledged
one area in need of redress that is helping to fuel the opioid epidemicprescription duration.22 4 Dr. Gottlieb then went on to say that one of the
ways the FDA believes it can work with providers to address this health
218.
219.

Id. at 5-6; cf. supra note 145.
Monitoring Patientswith Pain, supra note, 44 at 10-11.

220.
221.
222.
223.

Id. at 6, 10-11.
Id. at 10-11.
Id. at 11.
See id. at 4, 10-12.

224. Scott Gottlieb, Statement by FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb, M.D., on New Steps to
Advance the Development of Evidence-Based, Indication-Specific Guidelines to Help Guide
Appropriate Prescribing of Opioid Analgesics, FED. DRUG ADMIN. (Aug. 22, 2018),
https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm6l7908.htm.
Our analyses suggest that the first prescription for many common, acute
indications could typically be for many fewer pills-maybe just a day or two

of medication rather than a 30-day supply, which is typically prescribed. In
some cases, the excess pills that aren't used by patients may end up being
diverted to illicit markets or misused or abused by friends or family members.
In other cases, patients who are prescribed more medication than necessary
may find themselves at increased risk for misuse, abuse, and addiction.

Id.
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crisis is through the creation of "evidence-based guidelines on appropriate
opioid analgesic prescribing to treat acute pain resulting from specific
medical conditions and common surgical procedures," in collaboration
with the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine.22 5
However, as the FDA has no authority to decree how a physician is to use
a given drug within the course of his or her practice once it has been
approved, these guidelines, like the REMS, will simply serve as an
example of appropriate provider behavior, and will not define a
compulsory course of professional practice with respect to prescribing
opioids.2 26
2. CDC Guideline for Prescribing Opioids for Chronic Pain
In 2016, the CDC published the CDC Guideline for Prescribing
Opioidsfor ChronicPain to "provide[] recommendations for primary care
clinicians who are prescribing opioids for chronic pain outside of active
cancer treatment, palliative care, and end-of-life care., 2 2 7 In this
permissive guideline, the CDC addresses multiple issues with regard to
prescribing opioids, including when treatment with opioids should be
initiated or maintained, and how a physician should determine the
appropriate drug and dosage to provide.22 8
The CDC recommends that physicians avoid prescribing opioids for
chronic pain unless they determine the risk to the patient is less than the
combined benefit to both the patient's function and level of pain. 2 29 The
CDC notes a number of alternatives to opioid therapy for chronic pain
derived from specific ailments-for example, "weight loss for knee
osteoarthritis"-and urges physicians to consider such alternatives before
prescribing opioids. 2 3 0 The guidelines also suggest that physicians should
initially prescribe immediate-release opioids when treating patients with
opioids for chronic pain, noting a higher risk of overdoses found where
patients were initiated on extended-release opioids. 231 Further, the CDC
advises prescribing the "lowest effective dosage" when starting a patient
on opioids, and reminds physicians that the "[bjenefits of high-dose
opioids for chronic pain are not established." 2 32 The CDC suggests that
225. Id.
226.
227.

Buzzee, supra note 64, at 226-27.
Dowell et al., supra note 17, at 1.

228.
229.
230.
231.

See id.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 17-18.

232. Id. at 22. "The clinical evidence review found only one study addressing the effectiveness
of dose titration for outcomes related to pain control, function, and quality of life (KQ3). This
randomized trial found no difference in pain or function between a more liberal opioid dose escalation
strategy and maintenance of current dosage." Id.
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when treating with opioids for acute pain, a three-day opioid prescription
should suffice and that more than a seven-day supply is likely
excessive. 233 The CDC advises following up with a patient within the first
month of being prescribed opioids-and additional follow-ups every
month or less-and to consider whether or not to taper-off the patient or
continue a given dose. 23 4 They also recommend checking prescription
drug monitoring programs to review a patient's prescription history and
urine testing patients before initiating opioid therapy to check for nonreported drug-use that could cause an overdose if combined with
opioids.235 It is also recommended that opioids not be prescribed in
conjunction with benzodiazepines and that doctors "should offer or
arrange evidence-based treatment (usually medication-assisted treatment
with buprenorphine or methadone in combination with behavioral
therapies) for patients with opioid use disorder." 23 6 Similar to the REMS
and prospective opioid-prescribing guidelines set-forth by the FDA, these
CDC recommendations do not mandate compulsory procedures for
prescribers to follow when treating pain with opioids, and therefore, do
not define a prescriber's course of professional practice.23 7
B.

State-MandatedPrescribingStandards

In order to curb the misuse of controlled substances, some states have
set up regulations that restrict a prescriber's ability to prescribe these
drugs, removing their ability to prescribe as they choose. 2 38 Two ways
states accomplish this end are by restricting the situations in which a
prescriber can prescribe pain medication and by restricting the quantities
and dosages for which these drugs are prescribed. 23 9 Alternatively, some
states have provided voluntary prescribing guidelines, specifically
targeted at the prescription of opioids. 24 0 However, because these
guidelines are voluntary, they do not, themselves, establish a standard of
care for prescribers.24 1 In response to a rise in prescription-opioid
overdoses, Washington state restricted prescriber prescription practices in
233.
234.
235.
236.

Id. at 16.
Id. at 25.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 32.

237.

See supra text accompanying note 226.

238. Dilcher, supra note 27, at 103-04.
239. Id. at 104.
240. See ARIZ. DEP'T OF HEALTH, ARIZONA OPIOlD PRESCRIBING GUIDELINES 1, 5 (2018),
https://www.azdhs.gov/documents/audiences/clinicians/clinical-guidelinesrecommendations/

prescribing-guidelines/az-opioid-prescribing-guidelines.pdf.
241. See id. at 2,5; see also COLO. DEP'T OF REGULATORY AGENCIES, POLICY FOR PRESCRIBING
AND DISPENSING OPIOIDS iii (2014), https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/dora/opioid-guidelines.
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2010 by passing a bill specifically targeting the treatment of chronic2 43
This bill, Engrossed
pain242 to curtail opioid abuse and diversion.
Substitute House Bill 2876 ("ESHB 2876"),244 states dose-limits and

"requires consultation with a pain management provider for any patient
2 45
on daily doses of opioids at or over 120 mg (in morphine equivalents)."
The law also requires patients to sign treatment agreements and demands
2 46
physicians create care plans and oversee patient compliance with them.
It should be noted that these guidelines are consistent with those offered
by the FDA and CDC, aside from their authority to command
compliance.2 47
Despite its aim to curb prescription opioid overdoses, the bill was not
well-received by physicians, many of whom feared prosecution under the
law.24 8 As a result of ESHB 2876, and the fear it invoked, many
prescribers ceased prescribing opioids to treat chronic pain and abandoned
patients that they had been treating.2 49 Critics of the bill view the doses
permitted as ineffective for the treatment of chronic pain and attribute
increased patient suffering to its passing and the resulting fear that
physicians will be prosecuted for their prescription practices.2 50 Since
2010, prescription opioid-related deaths in Washington have taken a slight
downward trend;2 5 1 however, heroin overdose deaths rose steadily from
2010-2015.252
New York also statutorily defines aspects of a prescriber's course of
professional practice in regard to opioids.2 53 In New York, "a practitioner,
within the scope of his or her professional opinion or discretion, may not
prescribe more than a seven-day supply of any Schedule II, III, or IV
opioid to an ultimate user upon the initial consultation or treatment of such
user for acute pain." 2 5 4 This particular provision of New York's Public
Health Law clearly states that a physician acts outside of the course of
242.

Dineen, supra note 41,at 59.

243. Lucas Newbill, Violating Free Speech in the War on Opioid Addiction: The Washington
Legislature's Voice in the Doctor's Office, 52 GONZ. L. REv. 95, 95-96 (2017).
244.

Dineen, supra note 41, at 59 n. 413.

245. Id. at 59.
246. Id. at 60.
247.
248.

See supra Part 111A.
Dineen, supra note 41, at 59-60.

249. Id. at 60.
250. Id. at 59-60.
251.

Opioid-Related Deaths in Washington State, 2006-2016, WASH. ST. DEPT. OF HEALTH I

(May 2017), https://www.doh.wa.gov/Portals/1/Documents/Pubs/346-083-SummaryOpioidOver
doseData.pdf (showing an overall decrease in the number of prescription opioid overdose deaths from

2010-2015, with increased death tolls in 2010 and 2015).
252. Id.
253. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3331 (McKinney 2018).
254. HEALTH § 3331(5)(b).
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their professional practice when prescribing more than a seven-day supply
upon the initiation of treatment for acute pain.255 New York also restricts
patients from being maintained on opioids for pain treatment for greater
than three months, or beyond the time tissue normally takes to heal. 2 56 If
a physician feels that a patient's condition requires opioid treatment
beyond this period, he or she must be following a written plan based on
recognized guidelines contained in the patient's medical record.257 New
York expressly prohibits prescribing controlled substances to addicts,
except in specific circumstances. 2 58 Further, New York prohibits refills on
Schedule II, and certain Schedule III and IV substances, without a new
prescription.259
New York Penal Law Section 220.65 makes it a class C felony for a
physician to unlawfully sell a controlled substance or a prescription for a
controlled substance. 2 60 A physician is in violation of the statute where
"he knowingly and unlawfully sells a prescription for a controlled
substance" and defines that "a person sells a prescription for a controlled
substance unlawfully when he or she does so other than in good faith in
the course of his or her professional practice." 26 1 This provision provides
the same good faith protection for providers allowed by the federal circuit
courts in prosecutions under section 841(a)(1) of the CSA, but more
narrowly restricts its prohibition to unlawful sales.262
Where New York clearly defines specific aspects of a physician's
261~ sakn
professional practice, jurors lacking in medical knowledge do not need
to place as much reliance on conflicting expert testimony to see where a
provider has prescribed unlawfully, and thus, has acted outside of the
course of his or her professional practice.264 Conversely, if a provider
prescribes opioids in accordance with provisions mandating the course of
their professional practice, it should be apparent to a jury that they have
done so lawfully.2 65
As previously acknowledged, the treatment of pain has been held by
physicians and scientists as a legitimate medical purpose for the
255.
256.
257.

Id.
HEALTH
Id.

258.
259.

HEALTH § 3350.
HEALTH § 3339.

260.
261.
262.

N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.65 (McKinney 2008).
Id.
Id.; cf. supra PartI.C.

§ 3331(8).

263. See Barnes & Sklaver, supra note 89, at 114-15 (mentioning the ways in which New York
and other states require physicians to actively verify a patient's need before prescribing controlled
substances).
264. See supra Part I.C.
265. See supra Part II.C.
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prescription of opioids.26 6 According to the CDC "[a]n estimated 20% of
patients presenting to physician offices with noncancer pain symptoms or
pain-related diagnoses (including acute and chronic pain) receive an
opioid prescription."267 One inference that can be drawn from this

estimate is that it is completely within the course of professional practice
to prescribe opioid medications when a patient presents with pain;
another, however, is that prescribers too-quickly prescribe opioids to
2 68
patients complaining of pain before considering alternative treatment.
In a state that provides statutory guidelines limiting the scope of a
physician's professional practice, jurors charged with determining
whether the physician prescribed opioids lawfully need-not make such
inferences as frequently as jurors in states that do not. 26 9 However, the
effects of these statutory mandates have questionable implications on
patient behavior where opioid-treatment is withdrawn. 2 70

IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION: NARROWING THE VIEW OF WHAT
CONSTITUTES PRESCRIBING OPIOIDS WITHIN THE "COURSE OF
PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE" FOR THE "LEGITIMATE MEDICAL PURPOSE"
OF TREATING PAIN BY DEFINING THE SITUATIONS IN WHICH A
PHYSICIAN CAN PRESCRIBE OPIOIDS IN GOOD FAITH UNDER STATE
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE ACTS

In order to fight the opioid epidemic claiming tens of-thousands of
American lives per year, while balancing this aim with the competing
fears of prosecution and untreated-pain,27 1 this Note proposes the
following model statute to narrow the scope of what constitutes a
physician's course of professional practice, specifically in regard to
2 72
prescribing opioids for treating pain:
A physician acts in good faith when prescribing opioids for the
legitimate medical purpose of treating pain,2 where he or she:
(a) does so legally; 274 and (b) his or her area of practice qualifies use of

266.
267.

See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
Dowell et al., supra note 17, at 1.

268. See id. at 2.
269. See Dilcher, supra note 27, at 95.
270.
271.
272.
273.

See
See
See
See

supra notes 251-52 and accompanying text.
supra note 27 and accompanying text.
infra notes 273-81 and accompanying text.
supra note 191 and accompanying text.

274. United States v. Feingold, 454 F.3d 1001, 1012 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that Feingold
illegally prescribed Schedule II substances in violation of an Arizona law forbidding naturopathic
physicians to do so).
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the chosen course of treatment;275 and (c) in light of admissible
evidence276 a reasonable physician in the same or similar area of medical
practice 277 would conclude that he or she: (1) exercised professional
judgment in an honest attempt to treat the patient to the best of his or her
ability; 278 and (2) prescribed with competence279 and respect for widelyaccepted2 80 and established treatment-standards. 28
States that adopt this statute can clarify the course of a physician's
professional practice for prescribing opioids by defining the defense to
their respective CSA instead of imposing liability for non-compliance
with additional restrictions on a physician's practice.28 2 Given the elusive
nature of pain and a physician's need to rely on a patient's subjective
manifestations to treat it, 2 83 it is no surprise that opioid regulation and
prescription practices vary greatly among the states. 2 8 4 This statute is
designed to overcome these inconsistencies, by objectively quantifying a
physician's subjective intentions for treating a patient and modifying the
reasonable physician civil malpractice approach to reflect the views of a
reasonable physician that is similarly situated to the prescriber in terms of
medical practice. 2 8 5 However, this reasonable physician does not just look
to the physician's intent, but to his or her competence and adherence to
established standards,286 such as those provided by the FDA and CDC.2 87
Through this objective-subjective approach, the statute would define
good faith under the adopting state's CSA, while also providing
physicians a concrete example of how to prescribe opioids in accordance
with the standard provided by Moore.2 88 Physicians prescribing opioids in
275.

United States v. Pellmann, 668 F.3d 918, 921 (7th Cir. 2012). Pellmann, a primary care

physician, used copious amounts fentanyl and morphine to treat a patient he diagnosed with trigeminal
neuralgia, "a condition he was unqualified to diagnose and did not treat in his own area of practice."

Id. at 926.
276. See United States v. Tran Trong Cuong, 18 F.3d 1132, 1141 (4th Cir. 1994). The Fourth
Circuit reversed Tran's conviction because of the improper introduction of expert testimony. Id.

277.

United States v. McIver, 470 F.3d 550, 556 n.9 (4th Cir. 2006) (borrowing from the

"reasonable physician" standard discussed by the Fourth Circuit).

278.

Tran Trong Cuong, 18 F.3d at 1138 (rephrasing the definition of"[g]ood faith" provided in

Tran's subjective jury instruction); cf. supra text accompanying note 218.

279. Feingold, 454 F.3d at 1013. Feingold "claimed that he was an incompetent doctor who was
honestly trying to help his patients manage pain" and that the charges against him arose as a result of
his lack of training. Id.; cf. supra text accompanying note 206.

280. See supra Part III.A.
281.

See supra note 232 and accompanying text.

282. See infra Part V.
283. See supra notes 192-193 and accompanying text.
284.
285.

See supra text accompanying notes 15-17.
See supra note 131.

286. See supra text accompanying notes 280-281.
287. See supra Part IU.A.
288. United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 138-40 (1975). Before convicting Moore of violating
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good faith, in accord with the statute, could prescribe confidently,
knowing that they did so for a legitimate medical purpose and within the
course of his or her professional practice. 28 9 This knowledge should
effectively eliminate the fears that physicians will be prosecuted for
0
prescribing, and that patients' pain will go untreated.29
V.

CONCLUSION

Opioids are killing Americans at an alarming rate and something
must be done to stop this tragic loss of life.291 Although the CSA provides
a scope within which physicians may prescribe these deadly substances,
the Act does not clearly define the appropriate boundaries for prescribing
them.29 2 This becomes problematic because in situations where doctors
are charged under the statute, it is essentially up to a jury of untrained
individuals to make medical decisions as to what is appropriate
prescription practice.293 By combining various approaches of the circuit
courts and defining the situations a physician can prescribe in good faith
under a state's CSA, the statute proposed in this Note offers a clear and
lawful course of professional practice for prescribing opioids to treat
pain.294 Although the boundaries afforded by the proposed statute are not
expressly defined in terms of appropriate dosages or prescription
durations, by approaching a physician's prescribing practices and
subjective intent from the objective viewpoint of a similarly-situated
physician, and accounting for legality, prescriber competence, and respect
to widely-accepted and established prescribing-standards, the proposed
statute-if adopted-would offer an approach to prescribing, that if
carefully observed, would effectively make it impossible for a jury to find
that a physician prescribed opioids outside the course of his or her
professional practice, beyond the reasonable doubt necessary to convict
under section 841(a)(1) or an equivalent state provision.2 95
In other words, if a physician prescribes opioids in accordance with
section 841(a)(1), the trial court instructed the jury:
[B]eyond a reasonable doubt that a physician, who knowingly or intentionally,
did dispense or distribute (methadone) by prescription, did so other than in
good faith for detoxification in the usual course of a professional practice and
in accordance with a standard of medical practice generally accepted in the
United States.
Id.; see also supra note 171 and accompanying text; cf. supra notes 273-80 and accompanying text.

289. Moore, 423 U.S. at 138-40.
290.
291.
292.
293.

See
See
See
See

supra text accompanying notes 248-250.
supra Part II.A.
supra Part II.B.
supra Part I.C.

294. See supra Part IV.
295.

See supra Part III.A.
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the statute, there is no reason to fear prosecution, and therefore no reason
to curtail treatment of patients with legitimate pain.29 6 By removing the
physician's fear that he or she will be prosecuted, the statute should also
alleviate a patient's fear of untreated pain.2 97 Thus, this Note urges the
legislatures of the fifty states to adopt this proposed statute so that good
doctors can be confident they are lawfully prescribing opioids to treat
pain, and those acting as "pushers" can be readily identified and
prosecuted, in the hopes that removing them and their poisonous
prescriptions from society is just the pill this Great Nation needs to
recover from the opioid epidemic. 2 98
Brendan LoPuzzo*

296. See supra Part II.A.2.
297.
298.

See supra Part B.B.
See supra Part IV.
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